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Gilmore 1
Chapter 1: Introduction
It is 2017. You are in a high school French class in your junior year of high school. Your French
teacher, from the lovely city of Toulouse, looks downright shocked. Of course, to put off going
over the grammar homework that you definitely did wrong, you ask “Madame Kas, qu’est-ce qui
s’est passé?” What is going on? She pulls up Google on the projector and types in “French
elections”; every single article title looks the same: MARINE LE PEN, FAR-RIGHT MAKES IT
TO SECOND ROUND; FRANCE’S MAIN PARTIES FAIL TO PLEASE VOTERS. Now, even
if French politics aren’t at the forefront of your mind, it was easy to understand that something
major had happened. Fast forward a year, Brexit has passed, Donald Trump is elected to the
White House, and it feels impossible to escape the word populism. Except now it seems that
everyone, according to the media, is a populist. Emmanuel Macron, Marine le Pen’s competition
and the victor in 2017, receives the title a few times. But how is that possible if he and le Pen
actively disagreed on so many different policies?
Return to today. If you type “French elections” into Google, you will likely find the
same, if not increased, fervor over the state of French politics. At the time of writing, Marine le
Pen is steadily closing the polling gap between herself and the incumbent President Macron
(Kar-Gupta 2022). Other notable figures are also gaining ground, Luc Mélenchon, a leader of the
far left, is holding steady at 17%, compared to Macron’s 27% and le Pen’s 22%. (Le parisien ;
April 6, 2022). The 2022 elections share another similarity with 2017, the idea of populism
remains ambiguous in the news media. All three of the leading candidates, despite having wildly
different campaign platforms, have been accused of being populist. More than that, France’s
“turn to the far right” (Zerofsky 2022) has led scholars and news media alike to claim that France
is having a populist moment. But with the lack of clarity surrounding populism in general, it
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seems difficult to accept this as fact. Is France having a populist moment, or is the news media
using the term because it garners more clicks on their sites?
My thesis looks to answer this question by conducting a study of the rhetoric of the top
French politicians since 1981. First though, it was vital that I understand what populism is.
Chapter 2 discusses these numerous definitions, but I found the most support for populism being
a thin ideology that essentially divides society into two parts, the pure people versus the corrupt
elite and that demands that the will of the people be the main goal of government. This ideology
is expressed through rhetoric. A populist leader will consistently frame their messaging around
the people and against the elite.
After discussing the definitions of populism, I move to a brief study of three different
regions where populism has manifested, America, Russia, and Latin America. While each
region’s populism has looked distinct, they all share the core tenets of my understanding of
populism, demonstrating that while populism is a broad concept, there are identifiable, and
trackable, components.
Using this understanding of populism provided by the definitions that are confirmed by
the regions where the phenomenon has been observed, I then turn to French populism in Chapter
3. The conception of populism in France is complicated by two factors which I discuss in detail
in this section: the existence of a left and right populism in the country, and the conflation of
populism with another political ideology specific to the region, Gaullism. Once I distinguish
these concepts, I discuss populism in France today, reiterating my guiding question, “is France
having a populist moment” and in Chapter 4 discuss how other scholars have gone about
empirically measuring populism. Chapter 5 presents my hypotheses and method and tests my
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hypotheses. I then discuss my results and ponder the questions that they may pose. Finally, in
Chapter 6 I conclude my thesis and discussion of populism.

Gilmore 4
Chapter 2: Defining Populism
To begin my project determining whether France is having a populist moment, I had to
have a working definition of populism that I could implement. This goal, however, became
complicated by the fact that there is widespread disagreement over the meaning of populism.
Ruth Collier (2001) indicates that the main problem with defining populism lies in the fact that
“the populist label has been attached to such a wide variety of political movements (right and
left, from above and from below) that it is hard to stabilize any core meaning that can work
rigorously as an analytical concept” (Collier 2001, 11814). Indeed, populist scholars have not
come to a consensus regarding what populism actually is. Karen Remmer, writing about Latin
American electoral changes and populist actors’ influence, defines populism as an anti-status quo
appeal for extended rights of social citizenship (Remmer 2012). Michael Kazin, in his Foreign
Affairs article discussing President Trump and Bernie Sanders’s populist natures, stresses the
importance of language in populism, with populist actors placing the people at the center of their
political agendas. Paul Ricoeur, a French philosopher specializing in hermeneutics, maintains
that populism is almost always “le discours de l’autre” the discourse of others, that aims to
“describe [a group] and disqualify [them]” (Godin 2012). Paul Taggart (2017) extends the
framework of Ricoeur’s discourse, and defines populism as political parties, who are antagonistic
to elites, that fetishize the purity of the people. Kirk A. Hawkins defines populism simply as
“discourse” (Hawkins 2009, 1041).
The notion of populism as political discourse, or rhetoric, has a decent amount of support
amongst scholars. Yet another definition along these lines is provided by Hans-Georg Betz
(2002), who understands populism as political mobilization through political rhetoric. Carlos de
la Torre seconds the importance of political rhetoric, describing populism as a “Manichaean
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discourse that divides politics and society as the struggle between two irreconcilable and
antagonistic camps: the people and the oligarchy or the power block” (de la Torre 2017, 2).
Taggart (2017) also shows an interest in rhetoric defining a part of populism, writing that “issues
are framed in populist terms. The issues themselves are not inherently populist” (Taggart 2017,
2). French scholar Christian Godin expands on the rhetoric that qualifies and defines populism,
stating it is the “condamnations sans appel des élites, la défense d’une identité nationale
menacée, et le rejet des forces étrangères menaçant cette identité” unprompted condemnation of
elites, the defense of a threatened national identity, and the rejection of foreign forces
threatening this identity (Godin 2012, 16).
The perception of a threat is likewise seen in a more ideological approach to populism
that “pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who
are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights,
values, prosperity, identity and voice” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 3). In a paper discussing
the populist impacts on foreign economies, Martin Rode and Julia Revuelta describe populism as
a “conglomeration of ideology, tactics, and strategy” that seeks to form “large gross-class
coalitions to implement a reformist set of policies” (Devinney and Hartwell 2017, 35; Rode and
Revuelta 2015, 75).
In one of the most extensive works on populism, simply titled Populism, Margaret
Canovan, rather than restrict populism to a single, simple definition, creates a typology. Her
typology has two major types of populism which are further broken down into seven subsets.
The first type, agrarian populism, describes populism as movements with a “particular kind of
socioeconomic base, liable to arise in particular socioeconomic circumstances, and sharing a
particular socioeconomic program” (Canovan 1981, 8). Her subtypes of agrarian populism
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include Farmers’ Radicalism, Peasant Movements, and Intellectual Agrarian Socialism. Her
second type, political populism, refers to “devices of direct democracy, revolting against elite”
(Canovan 1981, 8). Her four subtypes for this category are Populist Dictatorship, Populist
Democracy, Reactionary Populism, and Politician’s Populism. Her book provides extensive
examples for each type and subtype, though she indicates that while no populist phenomena she
describes can belong in every group, most, if not all of them, belong in multiple groups and are
not restricted to a single categorization. Canovan does not provide an explicit definition of
populism to her readers, allowing for some individual reflection on the subject, yet she does
point out that “two elements do seem to be universally present. All forms of populism without
exception involve some kind of exaltation or an appeal to ‘the people’ and all are in one sense or
another anti-elitist” (Canovan 1981, 294). Canovan does not believe that these commonalities are
enough to define populism, however, as she claims that they are too vague and ambiguous. She
points out that “the people” can be a completely different construction depending on the populist
movement being discussed.
Cas Mudde, another predominant populist scholar, disagrees with Canovan’s assessment
of these common features found in her populist subtypes. In his pivotal 2004 work on the
subject, The Populist Zeitgeist, Mudde provides a concrete definition of populism. He considers
populism to be “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”
(Mudde 2004, 543). Mudde breaks down his definition into four core elements: ideology, the
people, the elite, and the general will. For anything to be called populist, it should include all of
these features.
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For his first element, ideology, Mudde adapts Michael Freeden’s (1996) concept of a
“thin ideology.” Instead of providing specific views on political, institutional, or socioeconomic
issues, thin ideologies have “a restricted core attached to a narrow range of political concepts”
(Freeden 1998, 750). “Thick” ideologies, like Marxism or capitalism, provide an intensive
understanding on how, exactly, a government and society should be run. Populism and other thin
ideologies like socialism, merely describe the problems of a society and “offer general advice for
the best way to conduct its policies” (Mudde 2017, 4). By classifying populism in this way,
Mudde is following the framework of Giovanni Sartori’s Ladder of Abstractions (1970).
Essentially, Mudde is stripping populist movements down to their cores, which he provides in his
definition. By not getting too specific, but offering criteria, Mudde is able to conceptualize a
non-populism.
There are two clear opposites of Mudde’s populism: elitism and pluralism. Elitism is a
mirror of populism, by maintaining that the moral elites should oversee the amoral people.
Pluralism is populism’s direct opposite as it “rejects the homogeneity of both populism and
elitism, seeing society as a heterogenous collection of groups and individuals with often
fundamentally different views and wishes” (Mudde 2004, 544). For Sartori’s Ladder, this
creation of a contradiction is sufficient for populism to be considered a full theory that can be
studied further. In this vein, Teun Pauwels (2014, 2017) argues that populism should be
categorized “according to the type of ideology to which it is adjacent (neo-liberal, social, or
national)” (Taggart 2017, 3). The understanding of populism as a thin-centered ideology settles
Canovan’s problem with classifying populist movements. Now, instead of agrarian and political
populism established as similar but ultimately distinguished varieties of populism, they can fall
under the same, expanded umbrella of populism.
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Mudde’s second core element in his definition of populism is “the people.” The
fundamental populist belief regarding the people is that they are authentic (Mudde 2004). This
authenticity is understood in moral terms; their goals, political or otherwise, are consistently
aimed at doing “the right thing” (Mudde 2017, 4). Mudde acknowledges that the construction of
the people depends on who is framing the populist vision but insists that it does not make “the
people” any less important. He cites Benedict Anderson’s 1983 book, Imagined Communities, to
explain his reasoning, “history has taught us that the fact that core concepts of main ideologies
are based on ‘imagined communities’ has not made them less relevant in actual politics and
societies” (Mudde 2017, 6). Even if the idea of “the people,” continuously cited in populism, is a
construction, should the followers of the populist leader, party, or regime believe in it, it
becomes a relevant and key concept in the ideology. Christian Godin clarifies who “the people”
are, as constructed by populists, “le peuple du populisme n’a ni un sens ethnique, ni un sens
politique, ni un sens social. Il ne se définit pas pour, mais contre : contre les élites et les
étrangers” the people of populism do not have an ethnic, political, nor social sense. They are not
defined by for, but against: against the elites and foreigners (Godin 2012, 23).
Godin’s understanding of the people attached to populism lends itself well to the third
core element of Mudde’s populism ideology, the elites. In the purest form of populism, the elites
are distinguished from the people based solely on their morality (Mudde 2017). The “pure”
people are set against a “corrupt” elite. Godin puts the comparison simply, “pour les populistes,
le monde se divise en deux camps: ceux qui mentent, ceux qui disent la vérité” for populists, the
world divides itself into two camps, those who lie, and those who tell the truth (Godin 2012, 17).
However, the understanding of elites is often combined with other ideologies. For example, for a
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populism that has been combined with the ideology of nationalism, the elite may be those who
defend more open immigration and institutions that subvert domestic control over a region.
The fourth and final element of Mudde’s populism provides the solution to the problem
of elites being in control of a country’s institutions, the general will of the people. With the
corrupt elites in charge, the political system is inherently opposed to the will of people.
Essentially, populist want government policies to be dictated by the people’s desire (Mudde
2004). However, Mudde explicitly states that “populists are reformist rather than revolutionary,
they do not oppose political parties per se. Rather, they oppose the established parties” (Mudde
2004, 546). Put simply, the political parties that exist at the outset of a populist party’s creation
are corrupt, but, by listening to the general will of the people, the system in which they operate
can be fixed instead of supplanted entirely.
In William Barr’s (2009) essay on defining populism, the anti-political establishment
nature of populism plays a much larger role in classifying a political phenomenon as populist.
Barr provides three key factors that make populism an identifiable phenomenon: “the appeals
designed to build support, the location of political actors with respect to the party system, and the
linkages between citizens and politicians” (Barr 2009, 30).
Barr points out that a common tool for some political actors during a period of high
public discontent is the appeal to an anti-establishment discourse, which he defines as “the
rhetorical appeal used in opposition to those wielding power” (Barr 2009, 31). This interpretation
allows the understanding of anti-establishment to push past the political sphere and include any
institution that wields power. While populism can be interpreted as a meaningful threat to the
status quo, Barr notes that anti-establishment appeals do not go as far as anti-politics in
challenging an entire political system. Anti-political and anti-system actors, two categorizations
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he offers as related forms of oppositional politics, fall under the categorization of disloyal
opposition, meaning they do not follow normal democratic rules of engagement. On the other
hand, Barr (2009) says that anti-establishment politics fall under Andreas Schedler’s (1996)
categorization of semi-loyal opposition. They vie for votes by attacking not just the incumbents,
but “instead the entire entrenched power elite” (Barr 2009, 32), but they do not aim to replace
democracy, even if they suggest improvements to it.
While the anti-establishment appeal is important to Barr’s definition of populism, he
maintains that he puts less weight on the concept than other scholars. His focus on antiestablishment appeal is the construction of a “view of society where ‘the people’ (commoners)
are pitted against the power elite” that “invokes criteria for assessing the performance of a
political system and, thus, advocates prescriptions for change” (Barr 2009, 32). Barr
acknowledges that his first factor of populism can be used by any politician to distinguish
themselves from their competition, prompting him to add his second key factor, the location of a
political actor within the party system. For an actor to be considered populist, he must be an
outsider. The term, in Barr’s words, indicates someone “who gains political prominence not
through or in association with an established, competitive party, but as a political independent or
in association with new or newly competitive parties” (Barr 2009, 33). He clarifies that novelty
is not the sole characteristic that creates an outsider, smallness and marginality “may serve as
functional equivalents” (Barr 2009, 33). An outsider does not necessarily have to be irrelevant to
be considered an outsider. An electorally uncompetitive party can have a certain degree of
influence over the campaigns of establishment parties. Insider and outsider status, then, depends
solely on their placement within the party structure. There exists a political figure, however,
whose position in the system can complicate the clear-cut insider and outsider categories — what
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Barr deems “a maverick,” or “a politician who rises to prominence within an established,
competitive party but then either abandons his affiliation to compete as an independent or in
association with an outsider party, or radically reshapes his own party” (Barr 2009, 34). A
populist leader can be a maverick if they alter the status quo. If not, they are still considered
insiders.
The final factor that makes a populist according to Barr is what he calls “linkages” or
“the means by which political actors and constituents exchange support and influence” (Barr
2009, 34). For populism, which describes the relationship between government and the people,
how the two interact is of vital importance. Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl (1980, 1988) identified
four distinct forms of linkages: clientelistic, directive, participatory, and electoral. A party can
use multiple forms of linkages at any time. Clientelism is the exchange of material benefits for
support, “if you vote for me, I will do this for you.” Directive linkages “coerce constituents in
order to control them” (Barr 2009, 35). Participatory linkages give citizens some sort of role in
the government, like choosing party leaders from party support groups. The fourth linkage, and
most important for populism, is electoral linkages. Less frequent than the other three, only
occurring during elections, electoral linkages serve to hold elected officials accountable to the
general public. Barr emphasizes that “accountability is the crucial point of distinction here: rather
than offering citizens the chance to make their own decisions, this form of linkage allows
citizens to judge whether the rulers are doing a good job for them” (Barr 2009, 35). Barr then
adds his own linkage to the four, an extreme form of electoral power, plebiscitarianism.
Essentially, instead of offering a vote on something during the drafting process, policymakers
following this linkage offer the voters a simple choice, yes or no. In general, plebiscites serve “to
provide passive political support for a leader, to confirm the popular legitimacy of his authority”
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(Hayward 1996, 15-16; Barr 2009). Rather than democracy that truly takes the people’s opinion
into account, plebiscitarianism primarily focuses electoral power in a single leader claiming to
represent ‘the people.’
While appeals, location, and linkages are clearly distinct concepts, how they interact
accounts for Barr’s understanding of populism. As previously discussed, any political actor can
make an anti-establishment appeal, but it stands to reason that only outsiders and mavericks can
make reasonable, believable appeals of this kind. The critique that is inherently tied to antiestablishment politics is that “the political class has failed to tend the needs and interests of
ordinary citizens and, as a result, changes are necessary” (Barr 2009, 37). Barr sees three
solutions to this critique that are a part of the anti-establishment appeal: “a change of personnel;
a change in personnel plus improved accountability and government effectiveness; or a change in
personnel plus citizen participation” (Barr 2009, 37). Obviously, a change of personnel, or the
replacement of the elites in charge, is a part of all three options as it is the absolute minimum
solution to anti-establishment appeals. The option to improve accountability emphasizes the
electoral or plebiscitary linkages and “holds representatives accountable for effectively looking
after the needs and interests of ‘the people’” (Barr 2009, 37), and is therefore the most populist
choice. Instead of seeking guidance from citizens, this option assumes that the new leadership
has the people’s best interest in mind and will effectively implement it when in government. Barr
concludes his discussion of how his factors relate with this definition of populism:
Populism reflects the specific combination of appeals, location and linkages that
suggests a correction based on enhanced accountability rather than increased
participation. More specifically, it is a mass movement led by an outsider or
maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals
and plebiscitarian linkages. (38)

Gilmore 13

Populism as a Corrective
Barr’s definition of populism touches on a complication in populist literature, namely
whether or not populism is a threat to democracy. Due to the adversarial nature of populism,
many scholars are willing to commit to the idea that populist movements represent a threat to
liberal democracies. Others see populist leaders’ ability to garner mass support as an indicator
that liberal democracies and established parties had failed to entice significant chunks of their
citizenry, so populism serves as a corrective to that problem. According to Panizza (2005),
“populism is always the result of a crisis of representation in the existing political order”
(Panizza 2005, 180). It only becomes a threat when the system handles it incorrectly.
The populist phenomenon that I am studying in France operates under the order of a
constitutional democracy which is a two-strand institutional model with a democratic pillar and a
liberal/constitutional pillar. The democratic pillar relates to participation and popular
sovereignty. Populism can operate effectively within this pillar, as it advocates for the supreme
authority to lie with the people (Abts and Rummens 2007). The liberal constitutional pillar
accounts for the individual rights and the rule of law in a constitutional democracy. Checks and
balances are a vital part of this pillar, and populism does not fit here because it advocates,
essentially, for the tyranny of the majority, without any check for the minority (Abts and
Rummens 2007). Populist resentment under the two-pillar understanding of democracy arises
when the liberal/constitutional pillar becomes too powerful. Checks and balances are important,
but if a majority of the people feel ignored, they will begin to push back against the system.
According to Cas Mudde and Cristobál Rovira Kaltwasser, there are four possible
reactions to a rise in populist resentment. The first is a cordon sanitaire, blocking every part of a
populist agenda. This reaction will likely increase resentment. The second reaction,
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confrontation, involving attacks on populist entities and denying their legitimacy, will have a
similar result as the cordon sanitaire. A third possible reaction is adaptation. Major parties can
accept a certain degree of legitimacy in populist claims, understanding that the resentment must
be coming from somewhere, and therefore should be addressed. Finally, socialization,
complementary to adaptation, aims to pacify populist actors by accepting that liberal democracy
should have “public contestation,” thereby not excluding populists from public discourse, but not
necessarily giving them sway over any agendas (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, 213).
These four strategies hint at the key to ensuring that populism is a corrective rather than a
threat to democracy. The solution does not lie with individual leaders. Ultimately, “the path
towards populism can be found in a country’s institutional system and, in particular, the way in
which a country’s existing political institutions mediate the rise of populist leaders (or create a
propensity to populism)” (Devinney and Hartwell 2017, 36). Kitschelt and McGann (1995)
account for the rise of new, and sometimes populist, parties in established democracies by
observing new social cleavages that build upon the traditional, industrial revolution left-right
divide. They note that “radical right authoritarian parties tend to emerge when moderate parties
converge toward the median voter” (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, vii). Parties, as political
institutions, have tended to converge in the middle, leaving the extreme left and right open for
new parties. For Rummens, the rise in populist parties filling those gaps constitutes a big threat
to democracies as “populists do not share these core values [of liberal democracy] and they do
not recognize other politicians as legitimate adversaries. For them the political struggle becomes
once again an all or nothing affair in which their opponents appear as enemies who should,
ideally, be cleared from the political stage” (Rummens 2017, 9). While it is fair to assume that
populist parties are unlikely to be pluralistic and welcoming to collaboration with established
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parties, it seems rash to dismiss them as a threat to democracy without considering what their
electoral success might mean for a country’s political dynamics.
If “populism is a symptom or reflection of growing dissatisfaction with democracy,”
(Berman 2019, 657) then it should interest the political community of any country with growing
support for populist parties. If citizens believe that their votes do not matter, or cannot inspire
change in a system, then they will vote against the establishment. Berman (2019) uses the Great
Depression as an example of how the response of a government can change the outcome of an
extreme anti-establishment push back. The United States, while severely set back by the
Depression, did better at responding to it politically than the Germans, who shortly fell to the
Nazis. While it seems extreme to compare the recent rise in populist parties to Naziism, Berman
justifies his parallel by suggesting that fascism was a more dramatic response to a more dramatic
political problem.
The rise of new social cleavages, and the failure of establishment parties to adjust to the
new voter dynamic, creates the space for anti-partyism, or anti-establishment politics, to rise
(Viviani 2019). To rephrase Barr’s distinction between the two, “whereas the notion of ‘antisystemness’ refers to a principled opposition to the political system as a whole, ‘antiestablishment’ expresses an opposition to the governing political class in particular” (Bickerton
and Accetti 2018, 135). The established parties not adjusting quickly enough gives credence to
populist parties’ anti-party messaging. However, the threat of populism’s anti-pluralism taking
over a liberal democracy does not stem exclusively from their influence over parties. Devinney
and Hartwell (2017) detail how weak institutions can lead to a populist takeover:
The weaker the checks and balances on the execution of the power of the
executive, the more likely that those pursuing a populist agenda will be able to
capture all levers of government once in a position of power. The goal of such
capture would allow leadership that might not generate broad support for its
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populist policies to reduce the likelihood that the policies would be thwarted or
negotiated by either other populists, mainstream politicians, or the administrative
bureaucracy of the state… Similarly, control of state institutions allows for
increasing the likelihood that the coalition of internal powers — political social
and military — that lead to the leadership currently in place continue to be
satisfied… a change of political institutions can engender the largest amount of
uncertainty and, at the same point, effectively change the rules of the game going
forward. (43)
Ultimately, populism can be both a corrective and a threat to democracy. It is inherently in
tension with the system as “populists forces promote the re-politicization of certain topics that
are not mentioned by the establishment (whether on purpose or not)” (Mudde and Kaltwasser
2017, 205). This re-politicization can seek to include groups that have been left behind in a
modern democracy, but it can also be a negative force, with populist actors looking to break the
rules of political competition and seize the levers of democracy to fit exclusively their vision of
democracy.

Regional Examples
It can be difficult to grasp the core concepts of populism without concrete examples.
Turning to movements that have been consistently labeled populist can help clarify these ideas.
While some insist that populism has been a phenomenon since as early as the Roman Republic,
with the people-favoring Populares pitted against the aristocrat-loving Optimates (Stockemer
2019), most academic work places the origin of modern populism in the late 19th century with
the arrival of the United States People’s Party. (Stockemer 2019, Godin 2012, Canovan 1981).
America
The US People’s Party, founded in 1892, was an agrarian party at heart. Before reaching
the national stage, the party found their voice and early platform amongst rural farmers across
the nation around 1880. Three regional Farmers’ Alliances formed to combat the problems
facing their community, eventually realizing that if they worked together, they would have more
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political power, and thus joined under the banner of the People’s Party (Canovan 1981). The new
party increased their electoral appeal by claiming far and wide that the Republican and
Democratic parties were too similar and too worried about “special interests” (Kaltwasser et al.
2017, 3; Stockemer 2019). They believed that farmers had been abandoned in the wake of
industrialization, and that politicians in D.C. were too focused on pleasing railroad and industrial
leaders. The same railroad companies had a monopoly over cross-country travel and were
charging exorbitant prices to ship agricultural goods across state lines. Paired with a severe
drought and falling land prices making mortgages unpayable, the People’s Party found a
receptive audience for their platform, when they claimed that “executive power and patronage
have been used to corrupt our legislatures and defeat the will of the people, and plutocracy has
thereby been enthroned upon the ruins of democracy” (Party Platform 1896).
The People’s Party framed the farmers in the Midwest as “the patriotic people” and the
public servants as corrupt and indebted to the wealthy. More specifically, they pitted the southern
and western farmers against the “few millionaires” in Wall Street that controlled the markets on
which they relied (Canovan 1981, 51). Despite their initial wave of support, including a joint
nomination with the Democratic party for the Presidential ticket in 1892, the People’s Party
began dying off once the candidate, William Jennings Bryan, lost heavily to his Republican
opponent. Subsequently, major Democrats adopted the Populists’ most well-received policies
rather than pursue electoral partnerships. The Republicans took care of whatever remaining
support that was left by dramatically outspending the Populists in the next wave of elections
(Canovan 1981).
As the People’s Party was making inroads in the West, the next wave of US populism
was being born, literally, in Louisiana. Huey Long, the future governor and senator of Louisiana
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and a commonly cited populist figure, “got himself a name for redressing grievances and
standing up to the corporations” (Canovan 1981, 152). He rose to infamy during the Great
Depression, often claiming that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s policies were not radical
enough to save “the common man,” and filibustered one of his policies for 15 hours and 30
minutes (Long 1935). As governor of Louisiana, he championed extensive public work projects,
including a public highway system and the tallest capitol building in the nation. Instead of
targeting farmers in the Midwest, Senator Long broadened his audience, praising the “common
people,” a group consisting of “god-fearing” and “hard-working” Americans, while lambasting
the wealthy, saying in his famous Every Man a King (1943) speech,
It is not the difficulty of the problem which we have; it is the fact that the rich
people of this country — and by rich people I mean the super-rich — will not
allow us to solve the problems, or rather the one little problem that is afflicting
this country, because in order to cure all of our woes it is necessary to scale down
the big fortunes, that we may scatter the wealth to be shared by all of the people.
(Long 1943, 587)
While enjoying broad public support, Long was impeached in 1929 by the Louisiana
State Legislature after claiming that any lawmaker who did not support his proposed 5% per
barrel tax to fund his public works projects had been bought by the oil companies. He responded
to his impeachment in a newspaper article, writing,
I had rather go down to a thousand impeachments than admit that I am the governor
of the State that does not dare to call the Standard Oil Company to account so that
we can educate our children and care for the destitute, sick and afflicted. If this
State is still to be ruled by the power of the money of this corporation, I am too
weak for its governor. (Long 1943, 152)
Even during an impeachment investigation, Long maintained a strong populist rhetoric.
In a campaign speech for the election of Senator Hattie Caraway in Alabama, Long took
aim at the Democrats and Republicans, despite being himself a Democrat, saying, “they've got a
set of Republican waiters on one side and a set of Democratic waiters on the other side, but no
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matter which set of waiters brings you the dish, the legislative grub is all prepared in the same
Wall Street kitchen” (Long 1932).
While claiming to be a champion for the people, Long received a lot of criticism for his
open manipulation of the Louisiana state legislature, earning him the nickname “the Kingfish.”
Upon his assumption of the Louisiana gubernatorial position, he fired any perceived “enemies”
in the state bureaucracy. He filled every position available to him with allies and punished those
who went against him swiftly and definitively (Canovan 1981). As governor, Long was
essentially untouchable, escaping his impeachment by appealing to the people and threatening
his allies in the State Senate, forcing them to commit their unwavering support and ensure that he
was not convicted. Long was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1930, but only served 3 years before
he was assassinated, cutting his populist run short.
After World War II, populism in the United States became more frequently associated
with the right. In 1968, Alabama Governor George Wallace ran for the presidency on a thirdparty ticket, after leaving the Democrats, attacking “pointy-headed bureaucrats” and protesting
school integration and civil rights protests, infamously demanding “segregation today,
segregation tomorrow, segregation forever” (Lowndes 2017, 2; Wallace 1963, 2). ThenRepublican-candidate Richard Nixon, seeing Wallace’s populist rhetoric gain momentum,
adopted language like “Silent Majority, Forgotten Americans, and Middle America” in his own
campaign speeches (Lowndes 2017, 3). Populism waned on the right with the arrival of George
Bush and his goal of incorporating the elite into the Republican Party’s base (Lowndes 2017),
but in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008 and the arrival of the Tea Party’s antigovernment doctrine and the left-leaning Occupy Wall Street movement, populism was back in
full force.
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Recently, populism in America has been associated with political figures like formerPresident Donald Trump and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders (Pfau 2021; Gusterson 2017).
Trump centered his 2016 campaign on blue collar Americans, pitting them against illegal
immigrants, whom he infamously dubbed “rapists” in his Presidential bid kick-off speech, while
promising to “drain the Washington swamp” (Smith 2018). Sanders, for his part, centered his
populist rhetoric around the people, the working class, and against the elite, the billionaires in
America. While there was overlap between Trump and Sanders voters in 2016 — 12% of
Sanders voters in the Democratic primary voted for Trump in the presidential election — it is
hard to imagine two people farther apart on the political spectrum (Kurtzleben 2017).
Russia
Another commonly cited example of early populism began at a similar moment as the US
People’s Party, although in extremely different circumstances. In Russia, oddly, the populist
movement, or the narodniki, stemmed not from a response to explicit unhappiness amongst the
public but, instead, “grew directly out of the favorite institutions of the radical intelligentsia: the
student circle and the thick journal” (Billington 1958, 58). The oppressive Tsarist regime had
banned any and all political newspapers and parties, preventing any political movements from
truly thriving. In the late 19th century, however, Tsar Peter I, “who understood the grandiose
importance of public education for Russia” (Matveenko et al. 2018, 1) was attempting to
improve the Russian education system. His reforms, albeit fairly conservative, opened the
universities to political and revolutionary thinkers in Russia (Matveenko et al. 2018). In 1870,
the student intelligentsia were meeting in “circles,” or small groups of like-minded individuals
who rejected Marxism and worried over European influence in Russia (Billington 1958). These
concerns created a need for a new set of ideals for which to strive, inspiring the Russian populist
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movement. The movement grew quickly as the “first of the all-pervasive myths of the period, the
idea of the narod (the people)” was beginning to take hold (Billington 1958, 86). While today
most Russian words including naro are associated with this particular group that was active in
the 1870s, the term came from Slavophiles (Canovan 1981). An intellectual movement from
earlier in the same century, they wanted the future of the country to be based on the country’s
early history and believed that “Russia’s distinctive path of historical development, outside the
classical legacy of the West, was a blessing” (Poole 2020, 135). The term narod in the
Slavophile movement came to mean “the authentic representative of national identity” (Hughes
2013, 89).
Slavophilism had lost its relevance after the Crimean war, but “the concept of narodnoski
commended itself to two new groups of Russian social thinkers” (Billington 1958, 87). On the
right side of the political spectrum, thinkers took narodnost to mean “nation” and used it to
promote their belief in the supremacy of Russia. On the left, narodnost came to mean the spirit
of the people, and ultimately the “mystical faith in the superior wisdom and sanctity of the
people” (Billington 1958, 86). The intelligentsia of the 1870s capitalized on this understanding
of the narod, and applied it to the peasantry, which “at the turn of the century, still made up more
than 80% of the population of an empire which covered 16% of the earth’s land surface” (Eklof
2017, 6). Ultimately, for the populists:
The villagers embodied quintessential Russia on account of their number and,
especially, their authenticity. Since the people had not been contaminated with the
false values that had come from the West and perverted the cities, as well as the
entire Tsarist state, they would provide the recipe for the true social salvation of
the country from The Mirage of Europeanisation and the hypocritical liberalism
of the power holders. (Hermet 2013, 87)
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Scholars of populism have struggled with classifying this movement as populist because it began
with the intelligentsia and not the people: nevertheless, it clearly had the populist Manichean
divide of the narod, or the people, against the morally corrupt elite.
Despite populist concern over the future of Russia, political parties were still banned by
the Tsar, thus the movement used other strategies to push their agenda. The first program, and
perhaps the most ill-advised, was known as the khozhdeni v narod or the “movement to the
people” (Billington 1958, 78). Within the walls of their universities, no matter how much the
intelligentsia discussed and idealized the purity of the Russian peasantry, they were physically
and spiritually separated from them. They decided the solution to this problem would be to go
out and join the peasantry themselves. So, groups of university students traveled out of the
corrupted cities to join the farming populace. Quickly, the divide between the two groups
became obvious. The students, unused to hard physical labor, hindered rather than helped the
farmers they went to serve. The peasantry, concerned with feeding themselves and their families,
did not take to the moralistic philosophy that the students were trying to promote (Hermet 2013).
After this failed experiment, the intelligentsia turned to a more comfortable realm, and
ultimately “the populist movement coalesced into an organized revolutionary movement (Land
and Liberty) seeking to create a broad basis of support among the population and using the press
and the court system to publicize its goals” (Eklof 2017, 39). The Tsar was not happy with the
public push for reform, and so several of the populist’s prominent leaders were arrested or exiled
from the cities. The rapid repression of any anti-Tsarist sentiment caused the Russians to turn to
more drastic measures — a terror campaign. The Narodnaya Volya were the armed branch of the
populist movement and their “political aims were the overthrow of the Tsarist government and
the establishment of a popularly elected constitutional government” (Billington 1958, 108).
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Interestingly, despite beginning under an authoritarian regime and rejecting Western values as
amoral, Russian populists made similar calls for democracy as their American counterparts.
Persecution by the Russian ruling class caused the narodniki to slowly fade out of
relevance in the larger political arena, but their influence did not disappear entirely. Lenin, the
infamous leader of the Bolshevik’s and founder of Soviet Russia, held the political radicals of his
youth in high regard. Author Neil Faulkner, in his book A People’s History of the Russian
Revolution (2017), wrote that “the young radicals of Narodnya Volya were the heroes of Lenin’s
youth” (Faulkner 2017, 53). Lenin, however, was inspired not by their politics, preferring Marx’s
values to populist ones, but by their terrorist actions against the state.
More recently, the question of Russian Populism has been tied to Russia’s president since
2000, Vladimir Putin. His rhetoric, pitting Russians against the “evil” United States seems
entirely populist. Yet, while in power he has restricted the democratic capacity of the Russian
people and, after throwing a number of disloyal oligarchs into jail, rather than cleaning up
corruption, promptly replaced them with people more devoted to him, a decidedly un-populist
act (Medvedev 2004, 1). As a result, some scholars have clarified that “Vladimir Putin conforms
most closely to discursive descriptions of populism” (Burrett 2020, 197), meaning that he used
populist rhetoric when talking to the Russian people, but is not populist in the ideological sense.
To use Barr’s terminology, Putin was a political maverick in his early years, but as he rose to
power and did not change the status quo of the elites, he is not a true populist. Additionally,
Putin’s public rhetoric in recent years has transitioned to be more nationalist rather than populist
(Burrett 2020). Putin’s chokehold on Russian politics means that he has effectively put an end to
any competing rhetoric, thus populism remains a feature of 19th and 20th century Russia but has
struggled to take hold in this era.
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Latin America
Though the term populism might have emerged in the late 19th century following the American
and Russian movements, it would be impossible to discuss the concept without examining Latin
America, where there has been a higher concentration of populist leaders than anywhere else.
Carlos de la Torre (2017) provides a good summary of the phenomenon in Latin America,
identifying three distinct waves of populism in the region: classical, neoliberal, and radical
populism.
De la Torre, using his understanding of populism as a discursive, ideological strategy,
identifies the 1930s and 40s as the arrival period of populism in the region. His first wave,
classical populism, was a result of a crisis in societies with an oligarchical social order that
attempted to combine “liberal inspired constitutions (division of powers, and elections) with
patrimonial practices and values in predominantly rural societies” (de la Torre 2017, 2). The
organization of the civic community meant that the elites retained political power and excluded
the citizens who had no one to defend them. The onset of urbanization and rapid industrialization
and the general dislike of paternal authority in these countries provided the space for populist
leaders to gain support (de la Torre 2017, 2). In general, classical populists maintained highly
clientelistic relationships with their voting bloc, and thus received significant support from
workers and repressed labor groups. Typically positioning themselves against “foreign-oriented
elites,” the leaders fought against electoral fraud and looked to expand the franchise (de la Torre
2017, 2).
One of the most well-known populists, Argentina’s Juan Domingo Peron, emphasized the
distinction of the people from the elite in a 1955 speech,
Comrades, I want to remind all of you and all the Argentine people that the
dilemma is quite clear: either we fight and conquer to consolidate the conquests
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already achieved, or the oligarchy will overthrow them. They look for any pretext,
judicial liberty, religious freedom, or any other cause they can carry as a shield to
reach the objectives they pursue. (Peron 1955, 2)
Peron threatens the return of the oligarchy, maintaining that he is the only shield for the people
and their expanded rights under his regime.
In more industrialized countries, populist leaders focused on nationalist and redistributive
social policies (de la Torre 2017). While classical populists used mass rallies, rather than
increasing popular participation, to demonstrate their dedication to the people, they did
massively expand the franchise in their respective countries (de la Torre 2017). Past that,
however, their fervent support of democracy appears to be mostly empty promises to their
citizens, as they focused more on solidifying the executive power bloc than providing support to
their people.
By the 1990s, most Latin American citizens had the right to vote and were relatively
organized into political parties, weakening the strengths of the classical populists’ messaging and
leaving space for the arrival of the neoliberal populists. Interestingly, this new wave of populists
blamed the rise of economic strife in the region on “traditional politicians,” or the classical
populists. The elites, instead of the foreign-oriented construction of the classical populists,
became the white leaders who were enemies to the non-white citizenry (de la Torre 2017). Neopopulism, an excellent example of how the construction of the people and elites can change, also
highlights that populism is not tied to a certain side of the political spectrum; where classical
populists expanded social programs and government spending, neoliberal populists reduced the
size of the state dramatically while opening their economies to foreign investment.
Just as De la Torre’s second wave of populism responds to problems generated by the
first, so does the third wave, radical populism, respond to the problems generated by the second.
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It returns the populist phenomenon back to the left of the political spectrum. Responding to the
broad unpopularity of neoliberalist populism that had resulted in a large hike in gas prices, the
privatization of water, increased taxation, and included brutal crackdowns of popular protests,
leaders of radical populism framed the established political parties as tools of the elites, both
local and foreign. According to the new populists, these elites had “surrendered national
sovereignty to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US government” (de la
Torre 2017, 7). They promised to return the power to the people, and through input from social
movements and the common citizen would draft a new constitution to “‘refound’ the nation” (de
la Torre 2017, 7).
While the populist waves of Latin America have varied slightly in their construction of
the people and the elites who endangered them, it helps to look at the similarities to grasp how
populism can manifest in real life. David Doyle writes (2011),
Despite their apparent ideological differences, all of these [Latin American]
politicians and political movements display many of the central traits of populism
— such as highly personalized political movements focused around relative
political outsiders espousing a stridently anti-elitist discourse. (1448)
Ultimately, while populist scholars may disagree on how to classify Latin American populists,
they share enough similarities to improve our understanding of populism more generally. Under
each of de la Torre’s waves, populist leaders consistently positioned the good, moral people
against the corrupt, ruinous elite and they did so after the previous regime or political movement
found themselves unable to respond to the problems that faced the people.
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Chapter 3: Populism in France
With a better understanding of populism, we can return to the discussion of France. New
social cleavages in a rapidly modernizing Europe in the late-60s laid the groundwork for a rich
populist history in France (Surel 2002; Kitschett and McGann 1995). While the typical left-right
axis of political parties was covered by strong establishment parties, like the Parti Socialiste
Français and the Parti Communiste Français on the left and the Gaullist parties on the right, the
new social cleavage of libertarian-authoritarian left room for populist parties on both sides of the
political spectrum.
Right-wing populist parties in France began with the Poujadism movement in the mid
50’s. This anti-tax party focused on the threat of economic modernization and rapid
industrialization, targeting small town business owners and farmers. By the 90s, the right-wing
populist parties became increasingly concerned with European integration (Ivaldi 2019).
Sovereignist, Eurosceptic groups like Phillipe de Villers’ Mouvement Pour la France and
Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions began to capitalize on nativist and culturally exclusionist
ideals. They stressed that European ideals, pushed by EU integration, were hurting France’s
culture and people (Ivaldi 2019).
Left-wing populist parties in France are more socially inclusive than their counterparts
(Ivaldi 2019). Their construction of the “elite” focuses more on the economic elite in the country
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013; Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2016; Ivaldi 2019). Historically,
left-wing populism has been embodied by the Parti Communiste Français (PCF). Active since
WWII, the communists have extolled a Manichean divide between the ruling caste and the
hardworking people of France (Ivaldi 2019, Birnbaume 2012). Their dominance of the populist
left waned in the 80s, however, with the arrival of challenger parties like the Confédération
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Paysanne and Bernard Tapie’s 1994 populist campaign for the European elections in which he
won 12% of the vote (Ivaldi 2019). Jacques Chirac, a major player of the French left
establishment, adopted some populist ideas in his presidential campaign in 1995, but quickly
returned to business as usual once elected (Surel 2002).
Populism in France today is exemplified by two outsider parties, Marine Le Pen’s
Rassemblement National (RN), formerly the Front National, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La
France Insoumise (LFI). The RN is a typical example of radical right-wing populism (Mudde
2011, Ivaldi 2019). Begun in 1972, they brought together a group of small nationalist
organizations and became the predominant populist right-wing party in France. A peoplecentered party, they claim to protect the majorité silencieuse from the French elite, which to
them includes everyone from the news media, journalists, intellectuals, political elites (including
the so called “UMPS caste”), and the financial powers of the state (144 Engagements
Présidentiels, Rassemblement National, 2017). The UMPS caste is a conglomeration of the
acronyms for the two major parties in France, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP),
formed in 2002 as a merger of several center-right parties, and the Socialist Party (PS), which
has historically been the largest party on the French left. The RN frame them as the ultimate
enemies of the French people. More broadly, the RN embodies the nativist and authoritarian
focus typical of right-wing populist parties (Ivaldi 2019). For example, Marine le Pen stated in
the official platform that she wanted a tax on foreign workers’ salaries to “assure effectivement
la priorité nationale à l’emploi des Français” assure, effectively, national priority in employment
to the French people (RN).
As for the left, LFI has emerged as the preeminent left-wing populist party for the
French. They emerged in 2016 after a split in the Partie de Gauche (PG) coalition (Ivaldi 2019).
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The coalition had been based on anti-globalization social movements during the Lisbon
negotiations, which strengthened integration and expanded the EU (Ivaldi 2019). By the 2017
elections, however, Jean-Luc Mélenchon had left the group and created his own party, LFI, to
vie for the presidency. His party operates primarily along socio-economic divisions, promising
economic redistribution, increased public spending, and state intervention to the people of France
(Ivaldi 2019).
For both RN and LFI, the EU has come to embody the neoliberal elite that they lambast
in their public speeches. For the RN, the EU is an elite-driven institution that threatens France’s
national sovereignty over their laws, borders, and currency (Ivaldi 2019). The LFI views the EU
economy as too market liberal and overly focused on austerity politics.
Evidently, populism in France has been a consistent fact on both sides of the political
spectrum (Ivaldi 2019, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, Surel 2002). The left has been focused on
the “losers of globalization,” focusing their policies and rhetoric on the economy, taxes, and
French workers (Ivaldi 2019). The right centers their goals around identity politics, underscoring
the importance of French ideals on the political and global stage.

Gaullism
In France, in addition to the concept of populism being muddied by both sides of the
political spectrum having parties designated as populist, another political ideology represented in
the 5th Republic’s constitution, the aptly named Gaullism, also complicates the concept in the
region. Gaullism is the political movement and/or doctrine of the most famous French president
in history, General Charles de Gaulle. It has three waves that essentially track de Gaulle’s
influence in French politics and impacts our discussion of French populism.
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The supporters of the first phase of Gaullism, spanning the 1940s, include the French
who rejected the armistice with Nazi Germany during World War 2, and the Vichy government
led by Philippe Pétain. Gaullism in this period refers to General de Gaulle’s campaign to realign
France with the Allied Forces. This first wave of Gaullism helps explain the future political
gravitas of the General. His bravery, strategic expertise, and direct line of communication with
the French people during World War II helped solidify his political standing and instilled a deep
sense of trust in his policy-making decisions in subsequent years. This trust became instrumental
to the second and third waves of Gaullism, which are the forms of the ideology that often get
confused with populism.
In the second phase, occurring in 1950s France, De Gaulle was a vocal critic of the party
system of the Fourth Republic. Since its beginning, following the collapse of the Vichy
Government, it had been marred by “government instabilities and inefficiencies” (Surel 2002,
140). The parliament had been consistently stuck in political stalemates, caused, in part, by the
ease in which small parties could be elected to the body and control legislation. De Gaulle,
observing this political deadlock, lambasted the party system, saying “Le régime des partis, c’est
la pagaille” the regime of parties is a mess (Le Monde 1965). He believed that “it was the task of
statesmanship to articulate and kindle [shared noble purposes] by reaching for the summits, for
the dazzling, stellar light of national unity and ambition that he called grandeur” (Mahoney 1996,
pr. 1). Looking to realize that goal and mitigate the power of political parties and the parliament,
De Gaulle, tasked with writing the new 5th Republic’s constitution, created a semi-presidential
system. Should the parliament reach a stalemate, the president of France could now dismiss the
entire National Assembly and call for new elections (Conseil Constitutionnel).
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De Gaulle’s staunch disapproval of political parties, and the Fourth Republic more
generally, lead some scholars to associate the second wave of Gaullism, his constitution and
political beliefs, with populism. Especially since the second and third articles of de Gaulle’s
constitution state that the government would be “du peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple” of
the people, by the people, and for the people (Article 2) and that “La souveraineté nationale
appartient au peuple qui l’exerce par ses représentants et par la voie du référendum” National
sovereignty belongs to the people who will exercise it through their representatives and by the
avenue of referendum (Article 3). Populist values are therefore enshrined in the country’s
constitution (Surel 2002, Hartley 1971). However, consistent with William Barr’s understanding
of populism, de Gaulle’s ideology during this period is anti-system rather than antiestablishment. While both Populism and Gaullism can be considered correctives — populism
addressing a subset of the voting bloc left behind by the political parties and Gaullism addressing
constant governmental deadlocks — populism operates within the existing system, and the
second wave of Gaullism was a restructuring of the system entirely. Put more simply,
Populism… rests on two related dynamics. Classically, populism is a constant
recall of the determining nature of the people in the logic of politics — that is,
that the sovereign people are the sole bearer of legitimacy in a political
community based on democratic principles that the populous organizations claim
to represent. Secondly — and this is what distinguishes populous from antisystem parties — the stress on the people is accompanied by a critique of the
implementation of popular political supremacy by the elites, who were accused of
having betrayed the ideals and modes of legitimation and organization of the
political community. (Surel 2002, 151-152) Emphasis added.
Put differently, in populism, the blame for political problems lies squarely on the shoulders of
political elites. The system itself works; the political elites are ruining it. Gaullism, on the other
hand, faults the system for the problems facing France’s political community.
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That is not to say that de Gaulle does not have some populist tendencies. Notably, when
campaigning for constitutionalized reform (and beginning his party, Rassemblement du Peuple
Français) in June 1946 — “de Gaulle presented himself as the true friend of democracy, one
who understands the ways in which weak state can alienate citizens from the government,
engender anarchy and moral confusion — and strengthen the temptation of dictatorship”
(Mahoney 1996, 9). While this seems like a construction of a morally remiss elite, the parties of
the 4th republic, it was “France’s propensity towards profound partisan and ideological strife, the
waste of political and intellectual talents in “political confusion” and “national disunity” which
particularly pained de Gaulle” (Mahoney 1996, 19). De Gaulle did not inherently hate the
political parties involved in the 4th Republic’s parliament, just that the organization of the
government wasted the potential of strong political minds. Additionally, according to the Oxford
Companion to the Politics of the World, “populist movements claim to represent the people as a
whole: sometimes the entire nation, sometimes the majority of the people. They often begin this
movement with protest against parties which they see as entrenched defenders of the existing
social order” (Krieger et al., 678). De Gaulle on the other hand, “knew that in this century, ‘no
man can be the people’s substitute’” (Mahoney 1996, 22).
De Gaulle’s flirtation with populism continued throughout his tenure as the preeminent
French politician. He was a large proponent of direct electoral influence of the French populace,
believed in a strong electorate, did not like the parties under the 4th republic, was fairly
protectionist in his foreign affairs policy, and in 1968 following violent protests by French
students, called on support from the “silent majority” (Hartley 1971, 285; Mahoney 1996,
Dreyfus 1982; Krieger et al. 2001). He lacked, however, the moral dichotomy, the Manichean
divide, between the people and the elite. His political movement was more focused on bringing

Gilmore 33
France into the 20th century and rebuilding after World War 2. He did not use a call to the
people’s power to garner support for the reconstruction of a new France, instead he touted the
long history of France, and demanded that it be restored to its former glory. He often worked
with elites in the country, relying on his ministers to do the economic work, and he created a
system of negotiation between companies to revitalize the French economy. In fact, “it has often
been remarked that de Gaulle’s opinion of the French was as poor as his opinion of France was
high” (Hartley 1971: 17).
In short, de Gaulle was nationalist more than populist. He believed in the supremacy of
France but did not connect any problems with a certain construction of an elite. Certainly, he had
populist traits, he did refer to the “French” as a united people, but he did not pit them against any
specific group. He was wary of America, and decried an “American hegemony,” (Hartley 1971,
Mahoney 1996) but did not try and position the French people against them or say that he was
the only Frenchman that could stop them, more that the French should be wary of their
international politics and policies.
Making matters more complicated, however, is the 3rd wave of Gaullism, which occurred
after the death of the General in 1970. In France, de Gaulle is seen as:
the most important French political leader since Napoleon… due to his
extraordinary dramatic sense — demonstrated in his press conferences, TV
speeches, journeys at home and abroad, and many public ceremonies — his
mastery of the French language, and his success in establishing a regime that was
strong without being dictatorial — a novelty in French history — earned him the
admiration even of many of his opponents. (Krieger et al. 2001: 306)
The 3rd wave of Gaullism is the attempted appropriation of de Gaulle’s popularity by modernday parties and politicians. For example, Emmanuel Macron, the current president of the
country, consistently calls on de Gaulle’s memory to inspire unity, most recently using him to try
and amass support for a second, wildly unpopular, Covid lockdown (Flandrin 2021). More
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broadly, according to an article from France TV Info: “Être l'héritier du général de Gaulle : tous
les présidents… en ont rêvé” to be the next General de Gaulle: all the presidents have that
dream (FranceInfo 2020). Marine le Pen, looking to distance herself from her father’s more
radical, anti-Semitic statements, chose to rename the party he founded that she now leads from
Front National to Rassemblement National, a clear nod to de Gaulle’s first party, Rassemblement
du Peuple Français. In an interview with Le Monde Moderne, Jean Luc Mélenchon, founder and
leader of the party La France Insoumise, responding to the question, “de Gaulle peut-il être vu
comme un insoumis ?” responded with, “on peut dire que le De Gaulle de la Seconde Guerre
Mondiale s’est comporté comme un insoumis. Il nous fournit même un exemple vertigineux” one
can say that the de Gaulle of the Second World War carried himself like a member of my party.
He provided us with an amazing example (Mélenchon 2020).
De Gaulle’s status as a French national hero, and his staunch nationalism and belief in
France’s superiority, means that most of the top politicians in the country often try to emulate
him. Because of his political principle of Gaullism, this can obscure the understanding of their
populism. While both Gaullism and populism cite an understanding of the French people as a
unified group, Gaullism lacks the moral dichotomy that populism imposes on French society. De
Gaulle and his principles might suggest unhappiness and/or frustration with the stagnation
caused by the political parties, but de Gaulle recognized the importance of political elites
overseeing the country, for example “his repeated flouting of established authority had as much
to do with his profound appreciation of the decadent character of the French military and
political elite and state as it did with his supreme pride and recognition of himself as a ‘man of
character’” (Mahoney 1996, 4-5). Conversely, populists place the blame of political and societal
problems squarely on the shoulders of their constructed notion of elites and Gaullism blames the
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system. Put succinctly, in the words of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the same interview where he said
the de Gaulle of World War 2 would have been an insoumis, “Il est le père de cette monarchie
républicaine” he is the father of this republican monarchy (Mélenchon 2020). Therefore, de
Gaulle and Gaullism cannot be connected to populism because the status quo that modern-day
French populists are challenging was created by Gaullist principles.

Rise in Populism
Now that we understand the distinction between Gaullism and populism, we can study populism
in France’s politicians more accurately. The purported rise in populism in France follows the
trend in Europe. In Le Monde, one of the most widely read French language news publications,
there has been marked increase in the use of the word (Mazot-Oudin 2017). The phenomenon is
not exclusive to the French language, however, and the Web of Science database shows that the
number of publications containing populis* in the title, abstract, or keyword has had a sharp rise
in the 3 years (Brown and Mondon 2020). Italy, Ukraine, Spain, the United Kingdom, Sweden,
Austria, and the Netherlands all have parties that receive the title populist that sprung up in the
last twenty or so years. While scholars have not reached consensus over the cause of populism,
some consistent reference points have cropped up in recent European populism scholarship.
Multiple scholars point to the 2008 global financial crisis as a turning point in liberal
democracies (Ivaldi 2019, Berman 2019, Héro 2018, Mudde 2017). There had been economic
insecurity and inequality in democracies across Europe, and the Great Recession confirmed
many voters’ fears that their governments were not looking out for their best interests. Alexis
Héro (2018) adds that the rise in populism, caused by the economic crisis, was aggravated by
“forte immigration et l’accroissement du nombre de réfugiés” intense immigration and the
increase of the number of refugees (Héro 2018, 46). Additionally, an increase in terror attacks,
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notably the November 2015 Paris Attacks and the December 2016 Berlin Attack, strengthen
nativist-populist claims of domestic insecurity (Berman 2019).
Berman (2019) remarks that “populism is a symptom or reflection of growing
dissatisfaction with democracy,” and suggests that if citizens believe their votes do not matter, or
cannot affect change, then they will vote against the establishment (Berman 2019, 657). The
sense of political impotence in Europe is exacerbated by the European Union’s perceived
mismanagement of the crises facing the region. Their bungling of the problems facing the
continent, paired with economic integration rapidly outpacing political integration and the
European Monetary Union restricting the level of financial support that governments could
provide their citizens during the crash, created the sense that national governments had lost
control over their countries’ economic fates (Berman 2019). With traditional center-left parties
adopting policies more receptive to open markets, converging with center-right parties, populists
had a rich voting bloc they could capitalize on in the region.
In France, even as Marine le Pen’s electoral success shocked most media outlets around
the globe, the major parties’ failures could have been predicted. In the university SciencesPo’s
annual “Baromètre de la confiance politique” barometer of political confidence, a survey sent out
each year to French voters, political parties ranked the lowest in “trust afforded to political
institutions” in the country, at only 12%, compared to the hospital system which ranked at 81%
(SciencesPo 2019). More specifically,
Looking across both Sarkozy and Hollande’s presidencies, an average 60% of
voters said they “trust neither the left nor the right to govern the country,” while
an overwhelming 85% would agree that “politicians do not really care about what
people think.” Voters showed high levels of pessimism about the future for both
themselves and the country. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in
France remained exceptionally high at about 60% on average throughout both
Sarkozy and Hollande’s presidencies, culminating at 70% on the eve of the 2017
elections. (Ivaldi 2019, 11).
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Clearly, French voters were unhappy with how the major parties were handling governance
while in control. However, the problems France faces today are not necessarily new problems.
And even as populism is being used more frequently to describe the political response to these
problems in publications, there seems to be a discrepancy in understanding the ideology it
describes. For example, the news site Europe 1 published an article entitled “Le populisme chic
d’Emmanuel Macron,” but it is difficult to find an academic source that would classify Macron
as populist (Andre 2016). The question for this project becomes, is there an actual marked rise of
Populism in France (therefore a potential threat to its democracy), or is it just a new buzzword
that garners more advertising revenue for news media?
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Chapter 4: Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Populism
To answer this question, I needed to create a way to empirically measure populism over
time. There has been a severe lack of empirical studies of populism conducted in the French
language. During my research, I found a single French study that conducted an empirical
analysis of populism. While helpful, the lack of empirical studies, both in French and English,
demonstrates a rather large hole in the academic work in the study of populism, which tends to
be much more theoretical.
In one study, Pippa Norris chose to measure populism by conducting a series of expert
surveys. She used a list of populist leaders in 33 countries compiled by Kyle and Gultchin
(2018). The list identified populist leaders through “searches in the academic literature,”
meaning that a leader could be added to the list of populists if they were called populist in at
least one academic piece. Norris sent this list to more academics and asked them to fill out a
survey that would lead to a yes or no answer to whether the leader was populist. While this form
of measurement might be helpful in “weeding out” the excessive use of “populist” as an
adjective for leaders who might just be charismatic, I chose to not use this method for France
politicians because by basing it on expert opinion, Norris introduces a sort of bias. Also, Norris
found that the response rate colored responses. She had a lot of experts weigh in on politicians
from Latin America, where populism is more clearly in play, but for the more nuanced forms of
populism, she received fewer responses.
For my thesis, I prefer a computer-based analysis, as it can reduce bias. For the one study
I found in French, Chloé Thomas used a program to analyze the rise of Euroscepticism and
populism in political parties, adapting studies done by Jagers and Walgrave as well as Rooduijn
and Pauwels. Jagers and Walgrave used content analysis of news media specific to Belgium to
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identify types of populism. They created indices to calculate the importance of three factors they
saw as representative of populism, the people index, the anti-elite index, and the exclusivity
index. For the people and elite indices, they created a word bank for a computer to scan for in
speeches. Then they calculated the proportion and intensity of these words. The proportion was
the number of characters the word had in a speech in its entirety, and the intensity was how often
it was used in a citation. For the exclusivity index, they calculated sections that mentioned
societal groups as positive, negative, or neutral (0). Then they added all three together. If a
party’s result was negative, meaning that they frequently spoke about groups in an exclusionary
manner, that was, to them, a mark of populism.
Rooduijn and Pauwels compared classical analysis with computer-based analysis. For the
classical analysis (when a person is responsible for the analysis), they had a reader look for
people-centrism and anti-elitism. They also created a codebook that included an extensive list of
words that could refer to the people or elites. They had readers look for every reference in a
speech and then interpret the context and decide on whether the speech/politician was populist.
They also ran computer-based analysis. They created a dictionary of words they found relevant
to populism and had a program count the proportion of words that were in the dictionary.
For the French study, Chloé Thomas (2017) used two out of three forms of measurement
developed by Jagers and Walgrave, the people index and the anti-elite index, and developed her
own, a claims-for-democracy index. Thomas created a bank of words that politicians and parties
used to discuss the people, the elite, and a claim for democracy. Using those word banks, she ran
speeches and campaign media through the application Logiciel TXM, which gave the frequency
of the words, similar to Rooduijn and Pauwels. To calculate the importance of the indices,
instead of using just words, like Jagers and Walgrave, Thomas calculated the proportion of lines
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that contained the words to the rest of the speech. In her words, “un mot n’a, en effet, de sens que
dans un réseau de mots” effectively, a word only has sense in a the context of other words and
“nous pensons être mieux à même de rendre compte de la présence d’une rhétorique populiste,
qui ne se limite pas à des termes mais à des phrases complètes” we thought it would be more
accurate to measure the presence of a populist rhetoric which does not limit itself at terms but in
complete sentences (18-19). She further analyzed the uses of the words by conducting a forward
and backward reading each time a word came up, allowing her to place the words in context. For
the French language this is very helpful because words like “nous” or “eux” need more context
than the English equivalent of “us” and “them” might. Thomas’s study, while helpful, focuses on
analyzing the increase in Euroscepticism in populist parties, choosing to analyze only a handful
of French politicians over a very short period. I have adapted her technique so that it can be used
to study populism more generally and expanded the scope of analysis over a much larger stretch
of time. That way I can study if populism is rising in France.
Throughout all the different definitions of the concept and the numerous examples found
throughout history, a consistent pattern arises. The populism that I will look for in the French
presidential candidates’ books adapts the understandings articulated by Cas Mudde (2004),
William Barr (2009), and Jagers and Walgrave (2007). Populism is a thin ideology that separates
society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt
elite’, and which argues that politics and political actors should operate within the system of
liberal democracy to best express the volonté générale (general will) of the people. It is
expressed in political rhetoric and can be measured by three indices, the people index, the antielite index, and the call for democracy index.
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Chapter 5: Hypotheses, Methods, and Results
Based on my understanding of populism and the marked rise of the use of the word populism as
a descriptor in news media, I formulated five hypotheses that I will test using multiple methods.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. Populism in France will increase over time.
Hypothesis 2. Populism will grow following the European debt crisis of 2009.
Hypothesis 3. Populism will grow following the Syrian refugee crisis of 2016.
Hypothesis 4. In the most recent elections, France’s left populism will start adopting
exclusionary, right-populist ideals.
Hypothesis 5. Marine le Pen and Jean Luc Mélenchon will be significantly more populist than
Emmanuel Macron.

Hypothesis 1. We know that populist parties appear when the mainstream, established
parties fail to meet the needs of the electorate. They can serve as a corrective to party blending,
ensuring that the voices of the voters who feel ignored are heard. Considering the French
public’s dissatisfaction with the state of established parties as seen in the annual barometer of
political confidence, I expect political actors to capitalize on this unhappiness, and as a result
populism will be increase.
Hypothesis 2. The European debt crisis of 2009 and the subsequent global recession
caused trust in the European Union to fall dramatically. According to the European Union’s
Eurobarometer, in 2008, at the onset of the financial troubles to follow, “46% (+20) of EU
respondents believe that the situation of their national economy will be worse in the next twelve
months, only 16% (-8) that it will be better and 33% (-11) the same” (Eurobarometer SP 2008).
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In 2010, “confidence in the EU fell at the height of the crisis (42%)” (Eurobarometer 2010). For
French populist parties, who often frame the European Union as the elite of their country and
tend to appear where political parties fail to satisfy voter needs (Berman 2019), I would expect
this failure and lack of confidence to cause a spike in populist rhetoric criticizing the EU.
Hypothesis 3. Similarly to the 2009 financial crisis, the European Union’s management of
the 2016 Syrian refugee crisis caused general unhappiness with the institution. A year after the
crisis, “Immigration is the main challenge currently facing the EU (39%), followed by terrorism
(38%). At the national level, the main concerns are still unemployment (25%) and immigration
(22%)” (Eurobarometer Autumn 2017). I expect populist actors to capitalize on this unhappiness
and adopt rhetoric that emphasizes the EU’s failures.
Hypothesis 4. In 2012, Marine le Pen outperformed Jean Luc Mélenchon in the first
round of the presidential elections by 6 percentage points, winning 17.9% of the first-round
votes. Le Pen had outperformed her father’s best election result in 2002, shocking the French
news media. Her platform was focused mainly on criticizing the euro, with her stating, “L'euro
n'a tenu aucune de ses promesses” The Euro has kept none of its promises (Baralon 2017). It
follows that the other oft-cited populist candidate, Mélenchon, would adopt some of the language
that propelled le Pen forward in the previous campaign.
Hypothesis 5. Emmanuel Macron was a definite newcomer when he announced his
candidacy in 2016. He had no party and refused to identify with any side of the political
spectrum. As a result, several news media sources chose to describe his campaign as populist.
His campaign rhetoric, however, varied dramatically from the two recognized populists in the
2017 election, le Pen and Mélenchon. I believe that Macron’s early classification as populist was
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a reaction to his newcomer status, rather than a true reflection of his ideology, and thus will
identify him as a non-populist.

Method
To find whether there has been a rise in populism in France, and to test my other
hypotheses, I needed to access a consistent source of political rhetoric over time. While the ideal
example of pure political rhetoric would be campaign speeches, a consistent dataset was not
publicly available. During a French presidential campaign, the candidates publish videos and
transcripts of all their campaign speeches on a campaign website. The victors keep those
websites up for posterity, but the losers simply delete their websites, taking their wealth of
campaign speech transcripts with them. I did, however, find a workaround to this problem. In
France, it is a common practice for potential candidates to publish a book, a year or so before the
election, that details their vision for the future of the country. Generally around 200 to 300 pages,
these books effectively set up the candidates’ future platforms and therefore contain plenty of
political rhetoric to analyze.
Because I was looking to analyze the rise of populism over time, but did not have
unlimited resources, I could hardly hope to study every presidential election in the history of the
Fifth French Republic. I had to choose a starting point that would be realistic as well as marking
an interesting point in French politics. I chose the Presidential Election of 1981 as the start year
because it marks an important transition in French politics and the relevance of populism. In
1972, 3/5 of the French populace approved by referendum the enlargement of the European
Economic Community (CEE) to include as new members the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Ireland, and Norway. And 1981 marked the first time a non-right-wing party was elected to the
presidency of the 5th republic. Politics became more open, and candidates’ rhetoric started
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varying more from the “party line.” The subsequent election of 1988 marked the first time JeanMarie Le Pen made it to the first round of the presidential elections, the beginning of the rise of
his populist party, Front National. I thought that this transitional period, which saw the rise in
success of non-Gaullist parties, would engender more interesting political rhetoric, as major
politicians would be less likely to follow the party line that had thus far been dominant.
Beginning in 1981 and working towards 2017 means that I had to contend with
candidates from seven different elections. Choosing to analyze the rhetoric of just the winning
candidate would not have provided me with enough political rhetoric to get the lay of the land,
especially since the rise in populism in France is often associated with outlier candidates, and not
the eventual victor. However, in contrast to the United States’ rigid, two-party-dominated
system, France’s electoral and party system is more fluid. Any candidate who meets the
nominating qualifications can stand for the first round of elections. If no candidate gets 50 + 1%
of the vote, then the top two candidates from the first round automatically advance to a runoff
that takes place two weeks after the first round. Often, the first round of elections can include
anywhere from 10 to 15 candidates. To qualify for the first round, a candidate must collect 500
signatures from elected officials; these may be mayors, general councilors, regional councilors,
deputies, senators, or members of the European Parliament elected in France. While daunting,
this threshold does automatically exclude candidates with only a niche appeal. Also, in the
interest of keeping the data set manageable, I chose to have the threshold of qualification for my
study as winning at least 10% of the vote in the first round of the election. The only exception I
have to this rule is François Bayrou in 2012 who only won 9.13% of the vote as other candidates
that did not reach the threshold did not come close to it.

Gilmore 45
With that threshold in place, I had a total of 28 books to acquire and analyze, which,
accounting for candidates who ran multiple times, amounted to 16 individuals. In total, I have 28
candidates and access to 24 books, which totals about 5600 pages of data. I ran into a few
problems regarding accessing these books. For example, the book by Ségolène Royal, the runner
up against Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, Maintenant 200 mots pour changer la France, is not owned
by any library that Colby has access to, and if ordered, would have arrived in June 2022. Not
entirely helpful for my thesis due in April. Additionally, Jean-Marie le Pen, one of the most oftcited populists in France, only published one election book in 1994, despite running five separate
times, and meeting my threshold four times. With Le Pen being a large political figure in France
politics, however, I was able to access more of his political rhetoric and thus created a nearequivalent length source to the corresponding years’ candidates but was unable to locate a
satisfactory equivalent for the 1988 election. For the 2002 election, I used le Pen’s Programme
du Front National, a 187-page document that details his platform for the campaign. Similarly, I
used the 2007 election platform, but this document was only 69 pages, so significantly shorter
than the 2007 document.
Apart from Le Pen and Royal, though, I was able to locate and obtain the remaining
election books. To generate machine-readable text files from the hard copy book volumes, I had
to use a KIC Bookeye 4 high-resolution, large-format book scanner, which allowed me to create
searchable PDFs of each book. I then converted each of the PDFs to simple text files, so that my
chosen text analysis software could read them. Following this step, I had to go into each file and
clean up the data. The French accents on many of the pages confused the computer, and so I had
pages and pages of gibberish, which would have made searching for specific language nearly
impossible. I went into the files and for each section of gibberish, found the corresponding page
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and, if it had language relevant to populism, corrected the gibberish. The program I used
recorded all characters, gibberish or not, so by correcting only populist language, I did not skew
the data to be more populist because it would still be a fraction of the same whole.
After cleaning up the data, I plugged the files into the corpus analysis system, AntConc.
This system allowed me to search for words, or lists of words, and produced graphics that
showed how often they appeared in my text files. Using Tomas (2017) and adding relevant
language I found in Taguieff (1984) and Jamin (2017), I compiled lists of words that
corresponded to my three populist indices, the people index (Appendix A), the anti-elite index
(Appendix B), and the calls-for-democracy index (Appendix C). I added additional indicator
words if I thought that they were accurate indicators of populism and would add to my
understanding of the concept. While a race/immigrant index would have been informative on the
exclusionary tendencies of populists, I ran into some problems developing a list of words that
could indicate themes of race and Christian culture. The French are extremely proud of their
secular, laïque tradition, meaning that, for the most part, when religion is mentioned in these
electoral books, the candidate is talking about protecting and/or expanding secularism. While
laws that enforce the strict separation of church and state has been accused of actively targeting
non-Christian French citizens (Alouane 2017), it is difficult to adapt a list of words that account
for these nuances. However, considering a lot of anti-immigrant rhetoric is expressed through
concerns over border control, and, additionally, accepting Chloe Thomas’s reasoning that
populist parties “s’approprient les arguments eurosceptiques pour renforcer leur discours antiélite” appropriate eurosceptic arguments to reinforce their anti-elite disocurse (20), I tested a
list of words that she had used to indicate an anti-EU rhetoric (Appendix D). This anti-EU
rhetoric serves as a substitute for the exclusionary measure of populist rhetoric.
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Using the data captured by AntConc, including the number of “hits” my word lists got in
my text files, I created graphs in excel. To guarantee that the lengths of books did not skew my
data to be more or less populist, I calculated the percentage of populist language and populist
indices rather than simply count the number of hits. Each hit indicates an entire word, so I
calculated the percentage as the number of hits against the total word count of the book. Totaling
the populist language by election year will give a sort of timeline, though it will jump by 5 to 7
years, and indicate whether populism is on the rise in France.
Obviously, this is not an ideal form of measurement as the data skips years, but as an
initial indicator of growth, it is stronger than what scholars have measured in the past for French
populism. With that being said, I believe that this form of measurement will indicate a growth in
populism following certain shocks in the French political sphere.

Results
For each candidate, I calculated the aggregate populist level of their political rhetoric by
combining the lists for the people index, the anti-elite index, and the democracy index into one
master list and running it through each book. I then calculated the percentage of language that
fell under the label populist. However, as my understanding of populism is the conglomeration of
the people, the anti-elite, and the calls for democracy, I tested each candidate specifically for
each index in addition to the aggregate levels of populism.
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Figure 1 Aggregate Populist Level for each candidate, organized by election year

Figure 2 Break down of aggregate populist level by index
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Figure 3 Anti elite index

Figure 4 People Index
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Figure 5 Democracy index

Figure 6 EU references
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Hypothesis 1. This method and data set produced some surprising results. The first, the
aggregate of all three of my populist indices, while confirming my first hypotheses that there has
been a rise in populism in France, does not demonstrate a dramatic rise. In fact, the slope of the
trend line is only 0.00006x. It is worth noting, however, that the average populist level of the
2017 candidates is about 1/3 higher than the average level in 1981. The least populist election is
1988, though that could be due, in part, to the fact that Jean-Marie le Pen did not publish a book
for that cycle. In fact, le Pen’s populist results provide several questions regarding the
understanding of populism in France. Bearing in mind that he founded the FN, the almost
universally accepted representative of right-wing French populism, it is surprising that he scores
amongst the lowest populists for two of the three sources that I found for him. Le Pen’s data only
includes one election book, published in 1994 for the ’95 elections. Notably, this book scores
highly on the populism scale. The other two sources from 2002 and 2007 were my filler data that
included his campaign platforms. His low score in these two elections could suggest that while
he often receives the title populist, that might be a result of his unpopularity rather than a sign of
his true populism. However, it only takes a quick skim reading to identify another explanation
for his low populist score. Take this quotation from his 2007 campaign platform “Cette
immigration est poussée par le grand patronat pour qui elle est une délocalisation à domicile qui
lui permet de compresser les coûts salariaux, et par la classe politique qui y voit une clientèle
électorale facile” this immigration is pushed by big business for which it is a domestic
outsourcing that allows them to cut down on salary costs, and by the political class that sees in
[immigrants] an easy voter base (FN Programme 2007). Clearly, this language is entirely
populist, but, like a lot of le Pen speeches, it is also stylized. He uses the word “patronat” one
time and “classe” four times in all 69 pages of the document.
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Additionally, the shorter page count of this document presents a problem. Unlike the
election books that present themes and then elaborate more deeply, thus using repeated language
and phrasing, a campaign platform looks to present a candidate’s goals succinctly, avoiding
unnecessary fluff. The difference between the platforms and the election books can be seen by
examining le Pen’s data. The one election for which he published a book, 1995, accounts for his
highest populist level, and is one of the most populist books in the data set, suggesting that my
filler data, while interesting to look at, were not the best substitutes for the missing election
books.
Another interesting piece of data shown in Figure 1 is Jacques Chirac’s apparent rise in
populism after losing to François Mitterrand in 1988. Chirac was a two-term president and a
member of the well-established, center-right, neo-Gaullist party, Rassemblement pour la
République (Rally for the Republic, RPR) which under his leadership renamed itself l’Union
pour un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement, UMP). The UMP has been
typically recognized as the establishment center-right party in France politics. It is interesting,
then, that he, especially in 1995 and 2002, records some of the highest rates of populist rhetoric
in his books. Though perplexing, this observation is not necessarily surprising, especially when
considering the strategy of any political campaign. Surel (2002) acknowledges this phenomenon
when distinguishing populist ideology from “purely strategic discourse and demands,” stating “in
some cases adopting populist discourse allows repositioning to take place within the party
system and the creation of distancing from competing parties and leaders” (Surel 2002, 149).
Considering that Chirac’s party had been in power since 1993, therefore receiving a good chunk
of the blame for a 10% unemployment rate, it was vital that he created some of that distance
between his campaign and their governance. He adopted several populist elements, including the
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“belief that a gap had gradually opened up between the people and their political
representatives,” a gap that only he could fill (Surel 2002, 150). This adoption of populist
rhetoric is seen clearly in my data. Chirac had campaigned for the presidency in 1988 and had
obviously not employed this strategy. The following two elections, both of which he won, shows
how he changed his campaign strategy and ramped up his populist language. Following Barr’s
(2009) understanding of populism, Chirac could be classified as a maverick within the UMP, but
as he did not radically alter the status quo, cannot be a true populist.
In fact, there are a few examples of election results correlating with changes in the use of
populist rhetoric. In 1981, François Mitterrand’s election book was about .67% populist, below
the .79% median score. As the incumbent running in 1988, however, his populist rhetoric
dropped even lower to .41%. Nicolas Sarkozy has a similar pattern. A newcomer in 2007, his
rhetoric was .82% populist. The next election, it had dropped to .56%. While I cannot
confidently say exactly what caused this decrease in populist rhetoric, with all that is known
about populism, it makes sense that an incumbent would have less anti-elitist language than
someone campaigning from outside of the administration. Sarkozy shows the drop off,
decreasing in the anti-elite index, Figure 3, from .29% to .12%. Mitterrand shares this drop-off in
anti-elite language. In 1981, it accounted for .3% of his populist rhetoric and it dropped to .19%
in the subsequent election. Given that the only other incumbent accounted for in my data is
Chirac, who we have established used populist rhetoric in his campaigns as a strategy, I cannot
say that this pattern is a consistent fact of populism, but it certainly warrants attention given that
some populist scholars are trying to assert that populism is more than just rhetoric and instead
represents a sort of ideology.
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A vital feature of the ideology of populism is the importance of the people. When I
calculated the people index, Figure 4, however, I found a negative slope on the trendline,
meaning that references to the people in the election books have decreased over time. This oddity
can be explained, however, with more context on the candidates themselves. For example, the
primary source of the negative trendline of the people index is Georges Marchais. He has the
highest percentage of references to “the people” in his book, l’Espoir au Présent, yet in all my
research on French populism, he was not named explicitly as a populist. This abnormality can be
easily explained, Georges Marchais was the leader of le Parti Communiste Français (The French
Communist Party, PCF). While not always populist, communist parties share a similar tendency
to idealize the nature of the hardworking “people,” explaining Marchais’s high score in this
index (Ivaldi 2019). Take this quotation from l’Espoir au Présent,
Ce qui est, sera et sera toujours déterminant pour faire vraiment bouger la société,
c’est le mouvement populaire, c’est l’action et l’union des travailleurs euxmêmes, des gens sur des objectifs qu’ils définissent, soutiennent, contrôlent euxmêmes. Ouvriers, employés, techniciens, paysans, intellectuels doivent bâtir
l’union (123)
What is, will be, and will always be decisive to really make society move, is the
popular movement, it is the action and the union of the workers themselves, the
people, on objectives that they define, support, control themselves. Workers,
employees, technicians, peasants, intellectuals must build the union
The “people” that Marchais constructs in this extract consist of the working class. They alone, in
tandem with the party, can build the ideal society for a better France.
As the PCF’s electoral base was absorbed by other left-wing parties following the 1981
election and they slowly became less relevant in Presidential races, it makes sense that the
communist emphasis on the people has faded somewhat. Additionally, when Marchais is
removed from the data set, the trendline returns to a positive, though extremely small, value.
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Suggesting that aside from his highly charged rhetoric which spiked the data early on, references
to the people in political rhetoric has been increasing, even if only slightly.
While populism overall has been increasing only slightly according to my data, there is a
better way to examine the data that emphasizes the importance to all three indices to populist
ideology. Figure 2 graphs the distribution of the indices in each candidates aggregate populist
score. The most populist candidate would score high on the aggregate populism test and this
graph would be equal parts people, anti-elite, and calls for democracy. The 2017 candidates have
the best distribution of the three indices, save for a few outliers in the early years. Notice that the
communist George Marchais, while having a high score for the people index, has some of the
lowest in the other two indices. François Fillon, a member of the establishment party Les
Républicains, interestingly, has the most even distribution of all three sections, though he has a
relatively low aggregate score when compared to his two, clearly populist, opponents, Marine Le
Pen and Jean Luc Mélenchon.
While the distribution of the three indices has become more even in the rhetoric of the
French candidates, one index, the calls-for-democracy index, consistently scored the lowest in
the aggregate (Figure 5). The highest score, Chirac in 1995, only accounts for .24% of his
language. Marine le Pen, though ranking relatively high in the aggregate, scores only .07% in the
democracy index, just barely beating Macron, a low-scoring populist, at .06% for this index. Jean
Luc Mélenchon had a relatively high score for both the 2012 and 2017 elections, but was beat
out by a non-populist, a member of the establishment Républicains, who was low scoring in the
aggregate. While the trend line for the democracy index is positive, suggesting that there has
been an increase in calls for democracy over time, because they are only a small fraction of the
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overall populist rhetoric, I would pose that the importance of this feature to populist rhetoric may
have been overblown in some academic works.
Hypothesis 2. With the oddities being handled, we can now discuss my second
hypothesis, that populism will grow following the 2009 European debt crisis. Using my anti-EU
index, I found that the number of references to the European Union has been on a steady incline.
Interestingly, though he confounded my populist data, Jean-Marie le Pen scored one of the
highest anti-EU scores, at .48% in 2007. Nicolas Sarkozy scoring the highest in this index does
not automatically mean that he is a populist. According to Tomas’s (2017) research on how
Euroscepticism and populism relate, populists did not come up with anti-EU rhetoric by
themselves, rather they appropriated it to bolster their anti-elite sentiment. As Sarkozy scores
below the median populist score in the aggregate, scoring only .56% populist in 2012, he is not
in danger of receiving the title.
As for my hypothesis, I did not find a consistent enough jump in the data to confidently
say that populism increased after the 2009 crisis. Sarkozy, a low scoring populist, had the biggest
jump in EU references between his two books. This suggests that the European Union might
have been a relevant topic of discussion during the elections but does not confirm that populism
rose as a result.
Hypothesis 3. While I did not find sufficient data to confirm that there was a jump in
populism following the 2009 financial crisis, I found some indication that following the 2016
Refugee Crisis, populist rhetoric increased. More specifically, Marine le Pen’s populist language
ramped up. According to Figure 6, le Pen’s EU references jumped from .15% in 2012 to .53% in
2017. Alone, this fact could simply indicate that le Pen was responding to the political climate in
which concerns over immigration and terrorism, were at an all-time high of 39% and 38%,
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respectively. However, le Pen’s anti-elite rhetoric also increased between the two elections, from
.15% in 2012 to .49% in 2017 (Figure 3). While her people-index score dropped (Figure 4), her
aggregate populism score increased by about a third, from .65% to .97%, indicating that
following the 2016 crisis, her populism, especially her anti-elite and anti-EU rhetoric, ramped
up. While there is not enough data to indicate that her populism increase was due to the crisis,
the correlation should be noted.
Interestingly, le Pen’s .65% aggregate score is relatively low for someone that receives
the title of populist so frequently. However, her 2012 election book reads more as an
autobiography, a way to distinguish herself from her better-known father, rather than strictly
electoral. The fact that she ranks as high as she does on the populist score despite this fact may
say more about her populism than the actual score.
Hypothesis 4. While references to the European Union have increased over time, and
Marine le Pen’s rhetoric suggests that populist actors have appropriated anti-EU sentiment to
bolster their anti-elite rhetoric, as proposed by Chloé Tomas (2017), there is not sufficient data to
support my hypothesis that Jean Luc Mélenchon, a left populist, adopted protectionist,
exclusionary rhetoric typical of right populism. Though Mélenchon scored the highest on the
aggregate scale at 1.27% populist (Figure 1), his EU references only increased very slightly from
.19% in 2012 to .24% in 2017 (Figure 5). Unlike Marine le Pen’s 33% increase from 2012 to
2017, Mélenchon’s EU reference only saw a 5% increase. This change is not significant enough
to indicate that he adopted exclusionary rhetoric, especially as the increase in EU references are
not explicitly connected to his populism.
Hypothesis 5. Confirming my fifth hypothesis, Emmanuel Macron’s rhetoric scored the
third lowest on the aggregate populism scale, significantly lower than both Marine le Pen and
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Jean Luc Mélenchon. In fact, when looking at the three indices of populism, Macron consistently
had one of the lowest scores in the dataset, and he never scored above the trendline. During the
campaign, Macron’s status as a newcomer who did not conform to the typical party lines, often
declaring himself the candidate “ni de gauche, ni de droit” not of the left, nor the right (Wolfrom
2017), led many media outlets to declare him populist.
While he shares the anti-partyism that many scholars associate with populist actors, he
lacked the anti-elite and pro-people rhetoric that would help solidify his populism. Macron can
be described using William Barr’s vocabulary of “maverick,” in that he did not conform to the
French party system, but the appeals he used to garner support for his campaign did not utilize
populist strategies, disqualifying him from Barr’s definition of populism.
New Questions
When looking at my dataset, I was struck with how specific it was. Indeed, Chloé
Thomas found a similar problem, stating “ces termes ne représentaient qu’une part infime des
discours” the [populist] terms only represented a tiny part of the total discourse (Thomas 2017,
19). She chose to recalculate the data so that rather than count the number of times the word
occurred compared to the total number of words, it counted the proportion of lines each index
had to total lines of the document. She justified this correction by explaining that a word only has
meaning in the context of other words. The discussion of “the people,” for example, is only
relevant to populism with the other words surrounding it. After correcting her dataset, she found
significantly higher results of populist language. While I would love to have done that with my
data, I was using a pared-down program which only provided a “hit” count and, unfortunately,
does not include a line count feature.
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I do believe that my data would be more significant with this feature, however. Especially
based on the simple graphic that is produced by the application after running the data. Take this
screengrab that runs the aggregate list of populist indicator terms through eleven of the
candidates, for example:

The black lines indicate each page of text that included populist language. While each of these
candidates’ populist language barely made up 1% or less of their total language, this graphic
shows that populist rhetoric still occurred frequently on several different pages. I chose not to
analyze the data using these graphics, however, because they were too unspecific. Additionally,
the way the PDFs converted to text files meant that while the language transferred, the
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formatting was not completely accurate. For example, the line breaks copied over exactly, so a
sentence that might ordinarily span one line of text, could be broken up into three sections
because the book page was narrow. These graphics provide a general sense, rather than accurate
analysis, of the level of populism in a candidate’s rhetoric. I have attached the raw data in
appendix (E through K), however, so that the concentration of populist indicators can be better
visualized.
Additionally, I think my understanding of France’s populist trends over time might be
different if I had time to adapt Kirk A. Hawkins’s (2009) study on holistic grading of populist
rhetoric. Just from skimming unexpected results, like Jean Marie le Pen’s low aggregate
populism scores in 1998 and 2002, I could tell that his highly populist, but stylized, language
would not have been picked up by my indicator words. Moreover, I know, from the many papers
I have written as a French major, that the French hate repetition in writing. For my indices to be
effective, repetition is an absolute must.
Hawkins (2009) method that looked to standardize human interpretation and perhaps
prevent the holes that my computer-based method demonstrates, might have aided my project.
He created a rubric for a group of readers on what to look for in terms of populist ideals in a
speech. He then trained graders on the rubric using a set of example/anchor texts. He had 2-3
readers look at a single text in 4 different categories of speeches, a campaign speech, a ribboncutting speech, an international speech, and a “famous” speech. By varying the type of speech,
Hawkins aimed to prevent a specific type of rhetoric from clouding the analysis (a politician
might be more populist in a campaign speech in front of his supporters than on an international
stage, for example). While the election books I used worked as a consistent resource across
candidates and time, they certainly had limitations that Hawkins’s method would have helped cut
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through. Take the dilemma of Jacques Chirac as another example. Hawkins’s method might have
helped clarify that while he might have used populist rhetoric on the campaign trail as indicated
in his election books, his actual governance, which may have been identified in an international
speech, made him an establishment member rather than a true populist.
Another frustration that I faced conducting this research was the knowledge that
campaign speeches would have been more conducive to the research I was conducting. For
anyone undergoing a project like this, and who had more time than I did, transcribing recorded
campaign speeches, or accessing transcriptions provided by candidates during the elections
rather than years later, to create a larger database of accessible speeches would be helpful.
An important finding for the general understanding of populism as an ideology, the callsfor-democracy index was the weakest indicator of populism in my data. While Jean-Luc
Mélenchon scored the highest in this index, suggesting that perhaps it could be a well-founded
indicator of populism, it was easily the smallest part of his aggregate populism score. Outside of
Mélenchon, the spread of this index is much closer together, with the notable exception of
Jacques Chirac. This deviation poses an interesting question. Did Chirac score high in this index
in 1995 because he was actively trying to emulate populist rhetoric and therefore doubled his
calls for democracy? Obviously, this question cannot be answered with my data, but it bears
asking.
Ultimately, while my data shows that populist rhetoric has not spiked in the way the news
media would suggest, it is worth noting that the first-round elections have started to look
different in recent years, which could be influencing how populism is being reported.
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From 1981 to 2012, two patterns emerge. Either there are two clear winners of the first-round
votes (as in 1981 and 2012), or the vote is split among a few establishment parties (1995, 2002).
2017 marks the first time since de Gaulle’s creation of the 5th Republic that two nonestablishment parties made it to the second round. Indeed, François Fillon represented the only
member of the “normal” power bloc, as in a member of a major establishment party, Les
Républicains, that met my threshold that year, the other three candidates were operating outside
of the major center-right and center-left parties. Considering populism is feared, justified or not,
to be an indicator of the failure of a liberal democracy, it follows that news media would stress
the importance of the major parties failing to make it to the second round of elections.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Though my data shows that populist language only accounts for a small fraction of the
political rhetoric of the top French presidential candidates, I am not prepared to throw out the
concept entirely. For one, without the capacity to change how I tally the populist indicators, like
Thomas (2017) changing from word count to line count, it is hard to say how populist my dataset
is. If nothing else, my dataset shows that there has been a rise in populist rhetoric amongst the
top French politicians.
Additionally, the fact that the first round of the elections of 2017, and now 2022, had
political outsiders beating the biggest parties of the establishment says more about the state of
French politics than populist rhetoric might. Clearly, the French people were unhappy with the
status quo, and they expressed their displeasure in the voting booth. Accepting that populism is a
corrective in a liberal democracy, this disapproval of the major parties alone should cause
populist scholars to take note.
Indeed, my data poses several interesting questions that would enrich populist scholarship
if addressed. The first pertains to the drop off in François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy’s
aggregate populist scores after they were elected to office. It makes perfect sense that an
incumbent candidate would have less populist rhetoric than a newcomer; it is a lot harder to
condemn the elites of a country when you are in a position of power. However, Jacques Chirac
shows that this observed drop-off does not guarantee an incumbent will have less populist
language. But Chirac is an exceptional case, as his campaign strategy included a conscious effort
to increase populist rhetoric to distinguish himself from other candidates. This leaves lingering
questions for populist scholars. For those arguing that populism is an ideology, such as Mudde
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(2004) and Barr (2009), populism should have more longevity than the typical electoral strategy.
Hollande and Sarkozy threaten this understanding.
The state of French politics, unsettled in 2017, has unravelled further in 2022. Marine le
Pen made it again to the second round, comfortably, winning 23.1%, compared to Emmanuel
Macron’s 27.8%. Jean Luc Mélenchon was the only other candidate who made it close, winning
22% of the first-round vote. The socialist party (PS), historically one of the most popular parties
in France, had a record low of 1.75% of the vote. It would serve schoalrs well to look closely at
Le Pen’s rhetoric and ponder why it seems to resonate more with the French people than her
father’s. Are Marine’s values more tenable than her father’s? Or is it because the people are
more unhappy with the establishment, thus her populism is more paletable than her father’s was?
I think studying the difference in their rhetoric, both through computer-based analysis and
holistic grading would aid in understanding populism more broadly.
While it continues to escape definition, it is clear to me after doing this thesis that
populism is a political phenomenon worth studying. As it appears most frequently when
establishment parties fail to please their voters, populism can be an constructive tool in analyzing
the effectiveness of liberal democracies. In an ideal world, no citizen would feel ignored by their
elected officials. But populism can serve to correct this wrong, as imprecise as the observation of
it may be.
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Appendix
A. People-Index World List
Peuple
Population
Communauté
Français
Populaire
Citoyen
Société
Nation
Classes
Electeurs
Electorat
Travailleurs
Patrie
Nation
Occident
Victime
Ouvriers

Thomas 2017

Tatguieff 1984

Jamin 2017

B. Anti-Elite Word List
Elite
Bruxelles
Commission
Union Européenne
Merkel
Hollande
Valls
Gouvernement
Système
Pouvoir
Capitalisme
Banques
Euro
Intérêt
Étranger
Gros
Bureaucratie
Fraudeurs
Menteurs
Banquiers
Oligarchie

Thomas 2017

Tatguieff 1984
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Aristocratie
PS
UMP
C. Calls-for-democracy World List
Référendums
Souverainetés
populaires
Démocratie
Vote
Souveraineté
Souverain
Élections
Référendum
Démocratisation
Voter
Parlement
Consultation
Participation

Thomas 2017

Gilmore 2022

D. EU World List
commission
immigration
2005
austerite
euro
bruxelles
crise
contre
liberalisme
capitalisme

Thomas 2017
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E. Populism aggregate scan, 1981 Election Books

F. Populism aggregate scan, 1988 Election Books

G. Populism aggregate scan, 1995 Election Books
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H. Populism aggregate scan, 2002 Election Books

I. Populism aggregate scan, 2007 Election Books

J. Populism aggregate scan, 2012 Election Books
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K. Populism aggregate scan, 2017 Election Books
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